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ABSTRACT 
This paper reports the assessment method of the hydrocarbon sample collection standard 
operation procedure (SOP) using THERP. The Performance Shaping Factors (PSF) from 
THERP analyzed and assessed the human errors during collecting a hydrocarbon sample of a 
petrochemical refinery plant. Twenty-two scenarios and standard operating procedures (SOP) 
are analysed to identify the human errors. The event tree analysis is employed to quantify the 
human error. The finding revealed that the THERP is a feasible technique for measuring 
human performance errors and performance shaping factors.  




The Major Accident Reporting System indicates that human error was responsible for 90% of 
accidents, most of which could have been prevented by management measures; thus, the 
importance of human factors in industrial safety, and accident prevention is quite evident [1]. 
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Therefore, it is important to assess human reliability to ensure industrial safety. Human 
Reliability Analysis (HRA) has always been a serious concern of safety engineers and risk 
assessment analysts. The main reason for that is the subjectivity of the methods used to 
evaluate the human reliability and the uncertainty of the data concerning human factors, 
together with the complexity of the human behavior per se[2]. The HRA is performed not 
only to identify but also to measure the degree of errors of human activities while executing 
the tasks.  
Many researchers presented the HRA methods to assists the engineers in performing the 
analysis of the human errors and reliability. These methods are Technique for Human Error 
Rate Prediction (THERP), Cognitive Reliability Error Analysis Method (CREAM), A 
Technique for Human Error Analysis (ATHEANA), Human Error Assessment And Reduction 
Technique (HEART), The Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-Human Reliability Analysis 
(SPAR-H), condition based human reliability assessment (CBHRA) systematic human error 
reduction & prediction approach (SHERPA) and so on[3-6]. These techniques vary in the 
form of complexities from easy to complex to use.  
The THERP is the most widely used technique to date. It not only models human errors 
employing the probability trees and models of dependence but also, considering the 
Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) affecting the operator actions. The THERP used in many 
strategic industries mostly in the aviation, oil, and gas, nuclear power plants and electricity 
power plants [7, 8]. 
In the sample collection activities in a chemical plant, PSFs are the key contributor to human 
error [9, 10]. Therefore, to reduce the human errors, attempts are made to analyze the PSFs 
involved in this activity. The industries have taken initiatives to improve the PSFs such as 
predict the potentially hazardous situation, events of the process or operation. Other measures 
are anticipating the routes by which each of these fatal scenarios and providing some 
prevention suggestions or actions to avoid dangerous events if the safeguards are not enough 
[11-13].  
This paper presented the assessment method of the hydrocarbon sample collection standard 
operation procedure (SOP) using THERP. The method to assess the SOP of hydrocarbon 
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collection sample, results, conclusions and the direction for further research are presented in 
this paper. 
 
2. ASSESSMENT METHODS FOR COLLECTING A HYDROCARBON SAMPLE 
We employed THERP to analyze the human errors while collecting a hydrocarbon sample. It 
is also aiming at assessing the failure/success rate of the attribution of human factors at each 
operation step of sample collection procedure (SOP) of a petrochemical refinery plant. The 
assessment method for the sample collection SOP is illustrated in 1. The details of the 
assessment are discussed in the next subsections. As illustrated in Erreur ! Source du renvoi 
introuvable.this assessment method started with gathering the information required for the 
event tree analysis. This information includes the SOP and the scenarios of collecting the 
hydrocarbon samples, starting from open the valve, collect the sample, and finally, closing the 
valve. In addition, at the SOP and scenario analysis stage, the performance of the operator 
who executing that task was observed. The event tree was developed to identify the rate of 
failure of the operator in performing the tasks. The PSF will be analyzed, and identified on the 
basis of the above-mentioned rate of failure. Then, the specific and the overall rate of error of 
performing the task will be identified, and analyzed. Finally, if the specific error that relate to 
operator is found, the alternative SOP will be proposed so that the error can be reduced. 






















Fig.1. Method of assessing human error in the process of collecting hydrocarbon samples 
 
2.1 Assessment Methods for Collecting a Hydrocarbon Sample  
The information that related to the SOP is gathered. The data has been categorized into three 
stages; the open valve, collecting sample, and close valve stages. The SOPs of these activities 
are illustrated in Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.1.  
At this stage, the data related to the performance shaping factors (PSF) are observed and 
recorded. These data are the instructional length for performing the task (instructional length), 
the experience of the operator, the operator stress level during performing the tasks and the 
tagging level after collecting the hydrocarbon. 
The error data was collected on the basis of the observation of the operator during performing 
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the tasks. The observers were asked to confirm the correct SOP or the error(s) during 
executing the tasks. The simplified diagram of valve outlet, and the form used to record the 
observation is shown in Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.2 and 3, respectively. 
 






Fig.2. Simplified diagram of double valve outlet 
 
 
Fig.3. Form used to record the operator tasks during collecting the hydrocarbon sample 
 
2.2 Scenario and SOP analysis 
The scenario and SOP analysis are categorized into three; opening valve, collecting sample, 
and finally, closing valve. This SOP of opening valves consists of 8 steps:  
1. Confirm the V1 is closed - the operator will confirm V1 (see Fig. 2) is closed. The Finger 
Point Guarantee (FPG) for re-confirmation of the visual check, 
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2. Choose valve opener jig - the operator will choose a suitable valve opener jig from various 
sizes of the opener jigs (without number/label) from a designated rack, 
3. Turn V1 opens - the operator will use jig to turn the V1. The jig is required in turning the 
V1 due to its size is small for the hand grip, 
4. Confirm the V1 is open - the operator must confirm the V1 has been open visually. The 
FPG for re-confirmation of the visual check, 
5. Place down jig - The operator placed the jig at the reachable safety surface or table in 
order to prevent the any injuries or damages, 
6. Confirm the V2 is close - The operator must confirm the V2 is closed. Reconfirmation 
using FPG so that it can enter into the step 7, 
7. Turn the V2 open - The operator must turn V2 open using hand to let sample flow out, and 
finally, 
8. Confirm sample flow out smoothly - The operator must confirm that the sample flowing 
out smoothly visually and do reconfirmation of the visual check using FPG. 
The SOP of collecting the hydrocarbon sample. This SOP consist of seven steps: 
1. Flush the hydrocarbon sample for 30 seconds – The operator must flush the sample for 
about 30 seconds to remove all clogging or contaminant at sample line, 
2. Rinse sampling bottle with a liquid sample - The sampling bottle must be rinsed 
thoroughly using the liquid sample from V2 to remove all the contaminants, If the operator 
fails to rinse the sampling bottle, it will invalidate this SOP and has to repeat from step 1, 
3. Flush rinsed liquid to the vent - The liquid used during rinsing must be flushed through 
designated vent beneath the V2 in order to prevent the liquid from contaminate the air and 
may cause sparks, 
4. Re-rinse the sampling bottle with a liquid sample - To ensure the sampling bottle is rinsed 
thoroughly before filling the sample, 
5. Re-flush the rinsed liquid to the vent -  To ensure the liquid used for rinsing is properly 
flushed, 
6. Collect 250ml of samples - The sampling bottle must fill with 250ml of a liquid sample, 
and 
N. A. A. Aziz et al.            J Fundam Appl Sci. 2017, 9(7S), 255-271            261 
 
 
7. Place bottle on safety table - The sampling bottle must be placed on a sturdy table that 
reachable by the operator to ensure the bottle safety before entering to valve closing SOP. 
The SOP of closing valves consist of the following steps:  
1. Confirm liquid sample flow smooth - The smooth flow of a liquid sample must be 
confirmed visually, and reconfirmation using FPG, 
2. Confirm the V1 is open - The operator must check the loose condition of the V1 by hand,  
3. Close V2 - The V2 must be closed tightly until liquid sample stop flows 
4. Close V1 - The V1 must be closed using valve opener jig until tight, 
5. Give allowance to the valve - The valve must be turned 90 degrees opposite to give 
allowance to the valve, which is about a quarter turn from the fully closed position, 
6. Confirm the V2 is closed - The V2 must be confirmed closed visually and reconfirmation 
using FPG, and 
7. Confirm liquid sample stop flowing - The operator must open the V2 again to confirm the 
liquid sample has stop flowing and reconfirmation using FPG. 
 
2.3 Event Tree Analysis 
The event tree is aiming at identifying the operator errors during executing the task. The 
sample of develop in an even tree is shown in Fig.4. 
 
 
Fig.4. Example of event tree analysis 
 
The THERP employed the event tree to model all the possible errors before estimate the 
human error probability. The small letters e.g. the ‘a’, and ‘b’ indicate that the operators did 
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the task exactly as in the SOP. On the other hand, the capital letters e.g. ‘A’ and ‘B’ represent 
the tasks that are not followed the SOP.  At this stage, the probability of success in 
performing task a is:  
)(1)( APaP   (1) 
From the Eq. (1), the following relationship can be established:  
1)|()()|()()|()()|()(  ABPAPAbPAPaBPaPabPaP  (2) 
The probability that the operator will unsuccessfully complete the task is can be calculated as 












2.4 Performance Shaping Factor 
Performance shaping factor (PSF) is defined as any factor that influences human performance. 
In this context, the PSFs are (see Fig.3):  
1. External PSF: Instructional length for performing the task (instructional length) –  refer 
to the manual of SOP to perform the collecting sample. It has been divided into Written, 
Oral instruction and None (the SOP is not available). The instructional length that less 
than or equal to 10 steps to perform the task is considered as Low. If the number of steps 
bigger than 10 steps, the instructional length is set as High,  
2. Internal PSF: Experience of the operator – the operator that assigned to perform the task 
that less than or equal to 6 months is consider as inexperience worker, 
3. Stressors PSF: Operator stress level during performing the tasks – the stress level is 
categorized into low, optimum/normal, moderate, and high, and 
4. Internal PSF: Tagging level after collecting the hydrocarbon sample – divide to four; level 
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3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION   
The results of the THERP are shown in the sections. We divide into 3; before, during, and 
after sample collection. These results are shown in Table 1 to 3, respectively. The event tree 
analysis diagrams are shown in Fig. 4 to 6 for each SOP activity. 
 
Table 1. Errors during opening valve 
Steps Tasks Error Description Consequences 
1 
Confirm open V1 is 
close 
Omit confirmation 
Unable to confirm initial 
condition 
2 
Choose valve opener 
jig 
Choose wrong size jig Unable to open valve 
3 Turn the V1 open 
Omit turning 
Sample unable to flow 
Turn wrong valve 
4 Confirm V1 Open Omit confirmation 
Unable to confirm step 
execution 
5 Place down jig 
Hold on jig 
Difficult to execute another 
step 
Place jig at unsafe location 
Jig fell injuring operator 
Jig fell damaging jig or 
other equipment 
6 Confirm V2 is closed Omit confirmation 
Unable to confirm initial 
condition 
7 Turn V2 open Omit turning Sample unable to flow 
8 
Confirm sample flow 
out smooth 








F7 = 0.003 
F6 = 0.003 
F5 = 0.003 
F4= 0.003 
F3 = 0.003 
F1 = 0.003 
F2 = 0.008 
i = 0.997 
a = 0.997 
b = 0.997 
c = 0.997 
d = 0.997 
e = 0.997 
g = 0.999 
h = 0.997 
I = 0.003 
H = 0.003 
C = 0.003 
A = 0.003 
D = 0.003 
E = 0.003 
G = 0.001 
B = 0.003 
F8 = 0.003 
 
Fig.5. Event tree analysis at the open valve step 
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Fig. 4 shows the event tree analysis of the opening valve step.The small letters of “a” to “h” 
presents the success rates of step 1 to 8. The capital letters of “A” to “H” present the 
probability of steps 1 to 8 . The rate of failure and success at the open valve SOP are as in Eq 
(1) and Eq (2):  
Pr[FOPEN VALVE]= 0.003 + 0.003 + 0.003 + 0.003 + 0.003 + 0.001 + 0.003 + 0.003=0.022, 
Pr[SOPEN VALVE]=1-0.022=0.978 
 
Table 2. Errors during collecting sample 
Steps Tasks Error Description Consequences 
1 Flush samples for 30 
seconds 
Omit flushing Excessive cloggings and 
contaminant could affect 
sampling result 
Flushng less than 30 
seconds 
2 Rinse sampling bottle 
with sample liquid 
Omit rinsing Sampling bottled could be 
contaminated 
3 Flush rinse liquid 
through vent 
Operator flush the 
rinsed liquid at other 
places then designated 
vent 
Flush liquids could 
contaminate the air and 
cause spark 
4 Re-rinse the sampling 
bottle with sample 
liquid 
Omit re-rinsing Contaminants could still 
exists in the sampling bottle 
5 Re-flush the rinsed 
liquid to the vent 
Omit re-flushing Flush liquids could 
contaminate the air and 
cause spark 
6 Collect 250 ml of 
samples 
Operator collect less 
than 250ml of sample 
Sampling testing could not 
be executed 
7 Place bottle on safety 
table 
The operator did not 
place bottle on safety 
table 
the bottle could fell causing 
damage to bottle and 
injuries to the operator and 






F14 = 0.003 
F14 = 0.003 
F13 = 0.003 
F12= 0.003 
F11 = 0.003 
F9 = 0.003 
F10 = 0.003 
j = 0.997 
k = 0.997 
l = 0.99 
m = 0.997 
n = 0.997 
p = 0.99 P = 0.01 
L = 0.01 
J = 0.003 
M = 0.003 
N = 0.003 
K = 0.003 
o = 0.99 
O = 0.01 
 
Fig.6. Event tree analysis during collecting sample 
 
Fig. 5 shows the event tree analysis during collecting hydrocarbon sample.The small letters of 
“j” to “p” presents the success rates of step 1 to 8. The capital letters of “J” to “P” present the 
probability of steps 1 to 7. The rate of failure and success at the collecting sample are as 
follows:  
Pr[FCOLLECT SAMPLE]=  0.003 + 0.003 + 0.003 + 0.003 + 0.003 + 0.003 + 0.003=0.021, 





Table 3. Errors during closing valve 
Steps Tasks Error Description Consequences 
1 Confirm sample flow 
smooth 
Omit conformation Current flowing condition 
cannot be determined 
2 Confirm V1 is 
opened 
Omit conformation Current V1 condition cannot be 
determined 
3 Close V2 Omit closing Valve Could not sample flowing  
4 Close V1 Omit closing Valve Could not sample flowing  
5 Give allowance to V1 Omit giving allowance V1 could stuck 
6 Confirm V2 is closed Omit conformation Current V2 condition cannot be 
determined 
7 Confirm sample 
liquid stop flowing 
Omit conformation Could not sample flowing  
Not Critical 
 
Fig. 6 shows the event tree analysis of the closing valve step. The small letters of “q” to “w” 
presents the success rates of step 1 to 8. The capital letters of “Q” to “W” present the 
probability of steps 1 to 7. The rate of failure and success at the close valve SOP are as 
follows:  
Pr[FCLOSE VALVE]=  0.003 + 0.003 + 0.003 + 0.003 + 0.003 + 0.003 + 0.003=0.021, 
Using the Eq.(3) the total failure rate is: 









F22 = 0.003 
F21 = 0.003 
F20 = 0.003 
F19 = 0.003 
F18 = 0.003 
F16 = 0.003 
F17 = 0.003 
q = 0.997 
r = 0.997 
t = 0.997 
u = 0.997 
v = 0.997 
w = 0.997 
T = 0.003 
Q = 0.003 
U = 0.003 
V = 0.003 
 W = 0.003 
R = 0.003 
 
Fig.7. Event tree analysis during closing valve 
 
In summary, Tables 1 up to 3 identified the critical human errors. The event tree analysis in 
Fig. 4 up to 6 provide a quantitatvive measures of failure and success at the stages of opening 
valve, collecting samples, and closing valve.  This result highlights the fact that when 
performing THERP assessment at the opening valve stage, the human errors scenarios can 
present more pessimistic results [14].  
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4. CONCLUSION  
THERP is an effective technique for measuring human performance liability measure and the 
given scenarios and SOP is measured with the help of this technique. The THERP analysis 
was done separately at the stages of the SOPs of opening the valve, collecting sample and 
closing the valve. The error descriptions for first stage are omit confirmation, choosing wrong 
jig, place the jig on wrong place and omit turning. While the consequences that occur are in 
step one, four and six in which they were unable to confirm the initial condition but these 
consequences were not critical. The error descriptions for second stage are omit flushing, omit 
rising, flushing for less than 30 seconds, safety of bottle placement and operator did not 
collect the 250 ml sample. The event tree analysis is used to measure the failure of operator 
while performing the given tasks. It shows that the rate of failure for opening the valve was 
0.022 whereas the success rate was 0.978 and it is indicating that the task was performed 
efficiently, the rate of failure for collecting the sample was 0.021whereas the rate of success 
was 0.979 again depicting that this scenario was also handled smoothly. And rate of failure for 
closing the valve was 0.064 whereas the rate of success for this stage was 0.936 indicating 
that the operator did well. This means that the activity of collecting hydrocarbon sample was 
performed well and there was no sign of any dangerous event to take place. The SOP and 
scenarios which is design to measure this ask of collecting hydrocarbon is effective because 
no error is being done by the operator and he handled the task well. The operators followed 
the SOP at every stage so that the human error were minimized.  
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